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We use a bootstrap technique to construct a distribution of abnormal performance among 
UK equity mutual funds under a null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance. Such a 
distribution of random sampling variation around no abnormal performance is employed 
as an estimate of, or proxy for, luck in mutual fund performance. Actual performance is 
then compared against this luck distribution. Using a number of alternative risk 
adjustment performance models, we find that a small proportion of funds in the positive 
tail of a cross-sectional performance distribution produce a level of performance in 
excess of that which may be explained by good luck. Poor performance is generally 
found to be worse than bad luck.   
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
 
This study examines the performance of open-end mutual funds investing in UK equity 
(Unit Trusts and Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs)) during the period April 
1975 to December 2002. A data set of 1,596 funds is examined. This represents almost 
the entire UK equity mutual fund industry at the end of the sample period. In contrast to 
the US mutual fund industry, there have been comparatively few studies of the 
performance of UK unit trusts. Studies of UK unit trusts have, for the most part, 
examined issues such as overall fund performance relative to a benchmark market index, 
survivor bias and performance persistence.  A discussion of the literature on both the UK 
and US mutual fund industries is provided in section 2.   
 
This study advances the literature on UK mutual funds by explicitly controlling 
for random sampling variability in the performance measure using a bootstrap procedure. 
By constructing a distribution of sampling variability under a null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal performance one can estimate the distribution of performance which is simply 
due to random chance or ‘luck’. This provides a means of determining whether the 
performance of funds with the best records is simply due to good luck or whether there is 
genuine stock picking talent on the part of the manager(s). Likewise, it is possible to 
evaluate whether the performance of the worst funds lies within the boundaries of 
random chance.   
 
Many studies of UK equity mutual fund performance
1 rank fund performance and 
examine whether there is persistence in this performance among the top and bottom funds 
in subsequent periods throughout the sample period.  Performance may be based on raw 
returns or on a risk adjusted measure which controls for the return premia accruing to the 
risk characteristics of the stockholdings within the fund. However, while these methods 
correct for common variation in fund returns, they do not correct for idiosyncratic 
                                                 
1 A UK equity mutual fund is a fund in which at least 80% of the fund’s capital is invested in UK equity, as 
defined by the Investment Management Association (IMA), formerly the Association of Unit Trusts and 
Investment Funds (AUTIF). The fund is not necessarily operated from within the UK. Of the 1,596 UK 
equity funds examined in this study 305 are operated from outside the UK.    3
variation. This is important because with such a large number of mutual funds in 
existence one would expect that a number of funds will exhibit strong performance 
simply due to chance. However, the extant literature on UK fund performance does not 
explicitly model the role of luck in performance. 
 
The role of luck in mutual fund performance among US equity fund managers 
was first directly addressed by Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2003). 
Kosowski et al apply a bootstrap technique to establish the sampling variation in the 
performance measures under a null hypothesis of zero abnormal (risk adjusted) 
performance and compare the actual distribution of US fund performance against this 
bootstrapped distribution.          
 
A common difficulty in examining fund performance is that of survivor bias. 
Excluding funds which have failed to remain in existence throughout the sample period 
and drawing inferences about overall mutual fund performance based only on surviving 
funds can induce a potentially serious bias in such findings. This study controls for 
survivor bias by including 450 nonsurviving funds among the 1,596 funds which are 
examined.  
 
This study also comprehensively examines UK equity unit trusts by evaluating 
their performance using a greater number of alternative models of performance 
measurement than identified in the extant literature. Performance measurement models 
are extended to include conditional risk factor loadings and conditional abnormal 
performance as well as conditional market timing models. The momentum effect in stock 
returns is also examined as a source of cross-sectional variation in unit trust performance. 
In addition, the sample period under investigation in this study is the longest among 
similar studies. Examining such a wide range of performance measurement methods over 
a relatively long sample period reduces the risk that findings could be model or sample 
period specific.     
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Fund performance may also be influenced by the investment objective of the 
fund. In this study funds are classified by their self-declared investment objective. These 
include growth stock funds, income stock funds, general equity funds (income and 
growth) or small company stock funds. One cannot be certain that these investment style 
characteristics of the fund are adequately controlled by standard risk adjustment 
measures. Therefore, in order to investigate whether stock picking skills vary across 
funds with different investment objectives, this study also carries out the bootstrap 
analysis separately among funds with these four different investment styles. Kosowski et 
al (2003) find that many of the US funds with apparent stock picking ability, or fund 
“stars”, are those with growth oriented investment strategies.  This study will identify 
whether such findings transfer to the UK mutual fund industry. In addition, by examining 
the stock picking skills of funds which specialize in small company stocks, this study 
investigates the claim that the market for small company stocks is less efficient and is 
therefore more easily exploited by small company mutual funds.      
 
This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the literature on performance 
measurement and persistence in performance among international studies, the vast 
majority of which are studies of the UK and US mutual fund industry. Section 3 describes 
the bootstrap methodology used to provide an estimate of luck in performance. Section 4 
describes models of performance measurement and applies these models to the sample of 
UK equity mutual funds in this study from which a number of ‘best-fit’ models are 
selected for the bootstrap analysis. Section 5 provides a description of the data set of 
mutual funds and other variables used to measure performance. In section 6 the findings 
from the bootstrap analysis are reported while section 7 concludes.    5
 Section 2: Literature Review 
Available on Request. 
 
 
Section 3.  Methodology 
 
Many approaches to estimating mutual fund performance rely on estimating hypothesised 
models of equilibrium security returns in order to measure abnormal (risk-adjusted) 
performance. In turn, inferences regarding the statistical significance of abnormal 
performance are often based on standard statistical tests of measures such as alpha 
(Jensen’s alpha, Carhart’s alpha etc). There are two central difficulties with these 
approaches.  
 
First, for their statistical validity these tests require that the alpha performance 
measure be normally distributed. However, as will be seen in section 4 the residuals from 
Jensen, Carhart and other equilibrium model regressions are highly non-normal for 
around 70% of the mutual funds in the sample under investigation in this study. Hence 
the vector of model random disturbances may be poorly approximated by multivariate 
normality and in turn the distribution of alpha may not in fact be normal as required. 
Furthermore, it is also found that high variance non-normal residuals are far more 
prevalent in the top and bottom performing funds relative to the middle ranking funds and 
it is the former group of funds which are of most interest.      
 
Second, with such a large number of UK equity mutual funds in existence, 1,596 
in this study, one would expect that some funds will appear to exhibit abnormal 
performance simply due to chance alone. Therefore, the question arises as to how 
genuine stock picking ability may be distinguished from simple ‘good luck’. Likewise, 
how may true inferior performance be distinguished from bad luck? Following from 
Kosowski et al (2003), the bootstrap procedure in this study is an attempt to establish the 
boundaries of performance (good and bad) that is explicable by chance. Observed 
performance in excess of this is deemed to be superior/inferior.     6
 
    Adopting the Kosowski et al (2003) methodology, this study bootstraps the 
abnormal performance measure, (alpha or the t-statistic of alpha), under a null hypothesis 
of abnormal performance equal to zero. This allows a sampling distribution of fund 
performance to be constructed where ‘true’ abnormal performance is not present among 
funds. The procedure is to simulate the fund return under the null hypothesis (say 1,000 
times) for each fund in the sample. In each simulation the performance model is re-
estimated and the cross-section of performance measures are ranked from highest to 
lowest. Over 1,000 simulations this provides 1,000 best alphas, 1,000 second best alphas 
etc to 1,000 worst alphas, ie a distribution of performance is constructed under the null 
hypothesis at each point/percentile in the ranked cross-sectional distribution of 
performance. These bootstrap distributions represent random sampling variability in the 
performance measure at each point in the performance distribution around a ‘true’ value 
of zero, ie they are estimates of random chance or ‘luck’. 
 
We then compare the cross-sectional ranked measures of actual fund abnormal 
performance against the empirical bootstrap distribution of fund alphas under the null 
hypothesis at each point in the performance distribution. For example, we compare the 
highest ranked actual fund alpha against the distribution of performance under the null 
hypothesis at the extreme top end of the performance distribution. Similarly, we compare 
the second highest ranked fund alpha against the bootstrap distribution of performance at 
the second highest point in the performance distribution etc. The bootstrap p values 
indicate the probability of observing the actual observed level of performance simply due 
to random sampling variability in the performance measure around a true value of zero, ie 
the probability of observing this actual performance due to random chance or ‘luck’. The 
estimate of luck is based on the (large) sample of peer group funds. Alternatively, for any 
given level of performance, good or bad, one can identify how may funds in the sample 
one would expect to achieve this level of performance by chance and compare this to 
how many funds actually achieve or exceed this performance.  
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Equally, one can evaluate the bootstrap distribution of the t-statistic of alpha 
under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, Ho: αi = 0, and compare this 
bootstrap distribution to the observed t-statistic of alpha. Using t-statistics has more 
reliable statistical properties. Funds with fewer observations may be estimated with 
higher variance and less precision and will in consequence tend to generate outlier alphas. 
There is a risk therefore that these funds will disproportionately occupy the extreme tails 
of the actual and bootstrapped alpha distributions. The t-statistic provides a correction by 
scaling alpha by its estimated precision. The distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics for 
extreme values of the unmodified return t-statistics is likely to have fewer problems with 
high variance relative to the bootstrap distribution of alpha at that percentile in the 
performance distribution.  
 
For this reason in this study, the t-statistic of alpha is employed as the measure of 
abnormal performance and the bootstrap methodology described above is implemented 
for the t-statistic of alpha. All t-statistics are based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.   
 
The bootstrap procedure has the advantage that it provides a nonparametric 
approach to statistical inference about performance as it makes no assumptions about the 
shape of the true distribution of performance measures. As such the bootstrap technique 
provides an improved picture of the ‘empirical’ distribution of the performance measures 
such as alpha.   
 
To further improve the precision of performance estimates one can impose a 
minimum number of observations requirement for a fund to be included in the analysis. 
As indicated, an insufficient number of observations in the estimation is likely to increase 
the sampling variability of the resulting estimates which affects the tails of the actual and 
bootstrap performance distribution. In this study a minimum of 60 monthly observations 
is set as the requirement for the inclusion of funds in the analysis. The disadvantage with 
this approach, however, is that it may impose a certain survivor bias by restricting the 
examination to funds which have been skilled or lucky enough to survive for five years.   8
To examine the significance of this issue the sensitivity of the bootstrap results can be 
tested for a number of alternative minimum observations specifications. 
 
  In order to provide a comprehensive study of performance and to test the 
robustness of results, the bootstrap test is applied to alternative performance measurement 
models, ie both single and multi-factor models with unconditional and conditional factor 
loadings and alphas. Performance measurement models commonly applied in the 
literature are now described in the next section.  
 
 
Section 4. Performance Measures and Model Selection  
 
4.1 Performance Measurement 
An appropriate method of adjusting for risk is required when examining mutual fund 
performance. The performance measure depends on the asset pricing model chosen to 
represent the cross section of expected returns. The most common measures that appear 
in the literature and the measures that will be bootstrapped in this study are presented in 
this section. First, the theoretical basis for the performance measurement models is 
discussed. All models are then applied to the data set of UK mutual funds with a view to 
selecting subsets of appropriate models with which to perform the computationally 
intensive bootstrap analysis.      
 
4.1.1 Jensen’s Alpha Measure 
The Jensen (1968) measure represents abnormal performance based on a single risk 
factor model, ie the CAPM specification   
 
(4.1)                    (Rit-Rf) = αi + βi(Rmt-Rf) + εit   
 
 
where Rit is the expected return on fund i in period t, Rmt is the expected return on a 
market proxy portfolio, Rf is a risk free rate, typically proxied in empirical work by the 
return on a treasury bill. If the CAPM is the correct model of equilibrium returns then the   9
portfolio should lie on the Security Market Line and the value of alpha should be zero. 
Therefore, a positive and statistically significant value of alpha is hypothesised to 
indicate superior risk adjusted performance or stock picking skills (selectivity) on the part 
of the fund manager. That is, a positive alpha indicates that the portfolio has performed 
better than a random selection buy-and-hold strategy. Alpha may be estimated 
empirically from least squares regression of (4.1). Similarly, a statistically significant 
negative value of alpha is taken to indicate inferior risk adjusted performance.  
 
 
4.1.2 Carhart’s Alpha Measure 
The Carhart (1997) measure is the alpha estimate from a four-factor model which is an 
extension of (4.1) and includes additional risk factors for fund exposure to size, book-to-
market value and momentum strategies to model expected fund returns:    
 
(4.2)          (Rit-Rf) = αi + β1i(Rmt-Rf) + β2i(SMBt) + β3i(HMLt) +  β4i(PR1YRt)+ εit     
  
where SMBt, HMLt and PR1YRt are risk factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market value and one-year momentum effects respectively in the stock holdings of the 
mutual funds. Carhart’s alpha may be estimated empirically from (4.2).    
 
  The four-factor model is largely based on the empirical findings of Fama and 
French (1992 and 1993) and Carhart (1995). Fama and French (1992 and 1993) find that 
a three-factor model including market, size and book-to-market value risk factors 
provides significantly greater power than the CAPM alone in explaining common 
variation in stock returns. Fama and French (1992) report a strong negative relationship 
between stock returns and size: smaller firms tend to have higher average returns (the 
authors report a spread of 0.74% per month on average based on their size rankings). The 
size factor, SMB (‘small minus big’), is a measure of the difference between the returns 
on small versus big stocks
2. The economic rational underpinning the specification of a 
size risk factor is related to relative prospects. The earnings prospects of small firms may 
                                                 
2 The calculation of SMB and the other risk factors in (4.2) is described in Section 5.    10
be more sensitive to economic conditions with a resulting higher probability of distress 
during economic downturns. There is also the concern that small firms embody greater 
informational asymmetry for investors than large firms. Both these factors imply a risk 
loading for size and a higher required return by investors.  
 
Fama and French (1992) also report a strong positive relationship between stock 
returns and the book-to-market value ratio: stocks with high book-to-market ratios have 
higher average returns than low book-to-market value stocks (the authors report a spread 
of 1.5% per month between the highest and lowest book-to market stocks in their study). 
The book-to-market value factor, HML (‘high minus low’), is a measure of the difference 
between the returns on high versus low book-to-market stocks. As Fama and French 
outline, if stock prices are rational the book-to-market value ratio should reflect firms’ 
relative prospects. A high book-to-market ratio firm indicates low earnings on assets 
relative to low book-to-market firms. Consequently, there is a high book-to-market or 
‘value’ premium. Alternatively, if stock prices are irrational the cross-section of book-to-
market ratios may be the result of market overreaction to the relative prospects of firms. 
High (low) book-to-market ratios represent firms whose prices have ‘overshot’ on the 
downside (upside) and therefore the ratio predicts the cross-section of stock returns.  
 
The fourth risk factor, PR1YR, in (4.2) is an additional factor capturing Jegadeesh 
and Titman’s (1993) one year momentum anomaly. The PR1YR variable is the difference 
in returns between a portfolio of previously high performing stocks and previously poor 
performing stocks.  Its specification in (4.2) captures a fund’s sensitivity to following a 
zero-investment strategy of investing in past strong performing ‘momentum’ stocks and 
short-selling stocks with low past returns. Carhart’s main motivation for examining 
momentum effects is due to the inability of the Fama and French three-factor model to 
explain cross-sectional variation in ranked portfolio returns. Carhart finds that the 
momentum variable explains almost half of the spread in returns between the top and 
bottom decile portfolios of funds ranked by raw return. In a sense, the momentum factor 
is specified due to an ex-poste hypothesis that it ‘must be’ providing a proxy for a risk 
factor that explains a significant amount of common variation in fund returns. However,   11
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) suggest that the momentum anomaly is a market 
inefficiency caused by slow reaction to information.        
 
Carhart’s four-factor model in (4.2) may be interpreted as a performance 
attribution model where the coefficients and premia on the risk factors indicate the 
proportion of mean returns attributable to four investment strategies: high versus low beta 
stocks, small versus large capitalisation stocks, value versus growth stocks and one-year 
momentum versus contrarian stocks.  
        
 
4.1.3  Conditional Performance Measures 
The Jensen and Carhart measures described above are unconditional measures of 
performance: fund alphas are calculated as the past average excess return minus a fixed 
factor loading(s) times the average excess return on a benchmark portfolio(s). However, 
unconditional performance measures do not incorporate the scenario where fund 
managers identify changing market information about the expected returns and risk of 
individual securities, change the composition of the fund in response and thus possibly 
alter the risk of the portfolio. As an example of changing market information, Chan 
(1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) highlight, using US data, that as the market corrects 
for the under-pricing (over-pricing) of ‘loser’ (‘winner’) shares a significant shift in the 
Beta of these shares can occur. Also a number of studies have shown that the risk of a  
share can change through time as the financial characteristics of the company change, ie 
gearing, earnings variability and dividend policy (Foster (1986), Mandelker and Rhee 
(1984), Hochman (193), Bildersee (1975)). Therefore, even if the manager follows a buy-
and-hold investment strategy, the risk of the portfolio may vary over time in line with the 
changing risk of the underlying securities. In addition, the weights in a passive buy-and-
hold strategy will vary in line with the relative values of the underlying assets. Finally, in 
actively managed funds, the manager will manipulate portfolio weights and consequently 
the portfolio beta. These points taken together indicate that there may well be time 
variation in the portfolio beta.        
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Similarly, suppose as in Merton (1980), that a fund manager believes that 
expected market excess return and its volatility move together proportionately over time 
with economic conditions. Based on economic conditions a fund manager wishing to 
keep the fund volatility constant will lower the fund beta when market conditions are 
volatile and vice-versa. Because as a result the fund beta will be negatively correlated 
with the market premium, the average excess return of the fund will be less than the 
average beta of the fund applied to the average market premium. In this case the use of an 
unconditional beta would lead us to conclude that the fund has a negative alpha. In this 
example, this does not necessarily reflect poor stock-picking ability but the fact that in 
order to maintain constant volatility the fund reduces its risk when the premium for risk is 
high and vice versa. (see also Ferson and Schadt (1996)).     
 
 
4.1.4 Conditional Beta Models  
  Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the CAPM specification to a conditional 
performance measurement model by allowing the factor loading on the market risk factor 
at time t to be linearly related to a vector of instruments for the economic information set 
Zt as follows  
 
(4.3)        βi  = b0i + B'i(zt) 
 
where zt is the vector of deviations of Zt from unconditional means. Therefore, b0i is the 
unconditional mean of the conditional beta. Subbing (4.3) into (4.1) and generalising the 
notation to let rb,t+1 denote the expected excess return on a benchmark portfolio (market 
portfolio in this case) the expected excess portfolio return in the conditional beta CAPM 
can be written as         
 
(4.4)       ri,t+1 = αi + b0i(rb,t+1) + B'i(zt*rb,t+1) + εi,t+1 
   
As E[zt*rb,t+1] = E(zt).E(rb,t+1) + Cov(zt;rb,t+1), the specification in (4.4) captures the 
covariance between the market timing variables, zt, and the conditional expected excess   13
return of the benchmark portfolio. As before under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal 
performance αi = 0. The model in (4.4) can be extended to the Carhart four-factor model 
where the additional factor loadings are each modeled as conditional betas and as linear 
functions of the economic information set Zt. For L instruments in Zt the conditional four-
factor model involves (L+1)4 + 1 regressors. This Ferson and Schadt performance 
measure computes the alpha of a managed portfolio controlling for investment strategies 
that use publicly available economic information, which it is hypothesized predicts factor 
returns, to dynamically adjust the portfolio’s risk factor sensitivities.  
 
 
4.1.5 Conditional Alpha and Beta Models 
The model in (4.4) specifies the abnormal performance measure, αi, as a constant. 
However, it may be the case that abnormal returns are also time varying.  Christopherson, 
Ferson and Glassman (1998) extend the analysis of Ferson and Schadt (1996) to estimate 
conditional betas and alphas. They also assume a linear specification for the conditional 
alpha as a function of the instruments in Zt as  
      
  
(4.5)          αi = α0i + A'i(zt) 
 
Using (4.5) to modify (4.4) yields   
 
(4.6)        ri,t+1 = α0i + A'i(zt)  + b0i(rb,t+1) + B'i(zt*rb,t+1) + εi,t+1 
 
The conditional alpha approach can also be applied to the Carhart four-factor model and 
is a simple extension of the four-factor model with conditional betas described above. 
 
  To further examine how conditional alpha and beta models arise, assume a 
general linear factor model of the form  
 
(4.7)        Rit+1 = αi + βi'(Ft+1) + εit+1 
   14
where Ft+1 represents a matrix of the expected values of risk factors and Rit+1 is the 
expected excess return on asset i. A mutual fund expected excess return is then given by  
 
(4.8)             ∑ + + + =
N
i
it it t i R W r 1 1 1 , * ,  for N assets in the fund  
  
where Wit+1 is time varying and is given by  
 
(4.9)            Wit+1 = Wi0 + Wi'(zt)  
 
where Wi0, Wi are constants. For example, Wi0 may represent long run strategic asset 
allocation weights while Wi represents stock picking (or market timing) based on known 
information at time t.  
 
  Subbing (4.9) and (4.7) in (4.8) yields a model of the form in (4.6), which may 
have heteroscedastic errors.  
 
The performance measure from this conditional alpha and beta model is the alpha 
of a managed portfolio, controlling for investment strategies that use publicly available 
economic information to (i) add stocks with abnormally high expected excess returns 
conditional on the information and (ii) dynamically adjust the portfolio risk factor 
sensitivities conditional on the information.          
 
  Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) use 
instruments for economic information, Zt, that previous studies have shown are useful for 
predicting security returns and risk over time. These include: the lagged level of the one-
month TBill yield, the lagged dividend yield of the market factor, a lagged measure of the 
slope of the term structure, a lagged quality spread in the corporate bond market and a 
dummy variable to capture the January effect.
3 Of course, all conditional models may 
                                                 
3 A more detailed description of the conditioning variables as adopted in this study is provided in section 5    15
also be examined by applying subsets of the information set, Zt. The findings from such 
tests are outlined later in this section.  
 
 
4.1.6  Models of Market Timing  
In addition to stock selection skills, models of portfolio performance should also attempt 
to identify whether fund managers have the ability to market-time or predict aggregate 
market movements. This is, can fund managers successfully assess the future direction of 
the market in aggregate and either increase or decrease the portfolio sensitivity (Beta) 
accordingly? Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Merton and Henriksson (1981) are two 
commonly applied market timing models in the literature while Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
also estimate conditional versions of both these models.  
 
 
4.1.7 The Treynor-Mazuy Model  
The Treynor and Mazuy (1966) models is a quadratic extension of the single factor 
CAPM in (4.1). The model assumes that βi in (4.1) at time t may be expressed as a linear 
function of the expected future market excess return:  
 
(4.10)      βit = θi + γiu[rm,t+1] 
 
Replacing βi in (4.1) with (4.10) yields a quadratic of the form  
 
(4.11)         ri,t+1 = αi + θi(rm,t+1) + γiu[rm,t+1]
2 + εi,t+1  
 
where ri,t+1 and rm,t+1 measure expected excess returns over the risk free rate. γiu is the 
unconditional measure of market timing ability. The quadratic specification in (4.11) 
embodies the situation where during a market upswing a successful market timer has a 
higher than normal fund Beta and the fund performs better than it would otherwise, and 
vice-versa.   
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Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditionalise the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model by 
specifying βi in (4.1) at time t as a linear function of both the expected future market 
excess return and the public information set, zt. Substituting for βi in (4.1) with this linear 
function yields a model of the form  
 
(4.12)                     ri,t+1 = αi + θi(rm,t+1) + Ci'(zt*rm,t+1)+ γic[rm,t+1]
2 + εi,t+1  
 
where the coefficient γic  measures the sensitivity of the manager’s Beta to a private 
market timing signal. The term Ci'(zt*rmt+1) in (4.12) controls for the public information 
effect, ie it captures the part of the quadratic term in (4.11) which is attributable to public 
information variables, Zt. Therefore, in the class of conditional model in (4.12) the 
correlation between fund betas and future market excess returns which is attributable to 
public information variables is not considered to reflect market timing ability.   
 
 
4.1.8 The Merton-Henriksson Model   
Merton and Henriksson (1981) describe a similar model of market timing. In this model, 
fund managers forecast whether the future market excess return will be positive or 
negative. A positive (negative) forecast causes the manager to target a higher (lower) 
fund Beta. This is, from (4.1), βi is assumed to be a linear function of a constant plus a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one (zero) corresponding to a positive (negative) 
market forecast. Subbing such a linear function in place of βi in (4.1) yields a model of 
the form  
 
(4.13)       ri,t+1 = αi + θi(rm,t+1) + γiu[rm,t+1]
+ + εi,t+1    
 
where [rmt+1]
+  is defined as max(0, rmt+1).  γiu  is the unconditional measure of market 
timing ability. (Merton and Henriksson (1981) interpret max(0, rmt+1) as the payoff to an 
option on the market portfolio with a strike price equal to the risk free rate).  
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  To extend the Merton-Henriksson model to a conditional setting, suppose βi in 
(4.1) is written as  
 
(4.14)            βi = bd + γicD + (B'd + ∆'D)*zt   
 
where D = a dummy variable which equals one for a positive forecast of the future 
market excess return and equals zero otherwise. The specification in (4.14) is equivalent 
to the following: if the forecast is positive the manager selects βup = bup + B'up*zt while if 
the forecast is negative the manager selects βd = bd + B'd*zt, where forecasts are made 
conditional on zt. Subbing (4.14) in place of βi in (4.1) yields  
 
(4.15)           ri,t+1 = αi + bd(rm,t+1) + B'd[zt*rm,t+1] + γic[rm,t+1]
+  + ∆'[zt*(rm,t+1)
+] + εi,t+1 
 
where γic = bup - bd, ∆ = Bup - Bd. The null hypothesis of no market timing ability implies 
that γic and ∆ are zero. The null hypothesis of no selectivity implies αi = 0.  
 
  The broad range of models above describe the approaches commonly applied in 
the literature to measure risk adjusted (abnormal) performance among equity portfolio 
managers. In testing a hypothesis of fund abnormal performance, a researcher faces the 
joint hypothesis problem of whether the underlying model is in fact the correct model of 
equilibrium security returns. As a test of robustness, in this study each of the above 
models, and many variants of same, are estimated for each mutual fund. Results are 
averaged across funds and compared between models in order to select a number of ‘best 
fit’ or most appropriate risk adjusted performance measurement models to apply in the 
subsequent bootstrap analysis. Rather than select a single model, in this study 
representative models are selected from among the classes of models above, ie 
unconditional, conditional beta and conditional alpha and beta. The empirical findings 
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4.2 Model Selection  
In this section, the equilibrium models of security returns described above are estimated 
for all the mutual funds. Each model is estimated for each individual fund. For each 
model, cross-sectional (across funds) average statistics are presented. It is useful to 
examine the level and distribution of alpha, the normality and serial correlation 
characteristics of the funds, the significance of factor loadings and model selection 
diagnostics. Based on these statistics a subset of representative models from the classes of 
(i) unconditional models, (ii) conditional beta models and (iii) conditional alpha and beta 
models are selected for the bootstrap analysis in section 6. A subset of representative 
models is selected because the bootstrap methodology is computationally intensive and 
yields a large volume of results for discussion. These model estimation results are 




4.2.1 Unconditional Models of Performance  
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows the estimation results of the unconditional models including 
the CAPM (model 1), Fama and French (model 2) and Carhart (model 3) along with the 
unconditional Treynor-Mazuy (model 4) and Merton-Henriksson (model 5) market 
timing models. For example, the CAPM indicates that the cross-sectional average alpha 
was negative at –0.029% per month (-0.35% annually) indicating that the average mutual 
fund manager underperformed the market by this amount. However, this abnormal 
performance is not statistically significant at 5%. All t-statistics presented are averages of 
absolute values as otherwise average t-statistics may centre on zero. (This is particularly 
the case for the t-statistics of alpha). In addition, all t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. The Fama and French and 
Carhart multi-factor models produce broadly similar performance findings results where 
the cross-sectional average alpha in each case is slightly lower at around –0.07% per 
month compared to the CAPM. A lower value of alpha is to be expected as fund 
performance is adjusted for additional risk factors in the multi-factor models. In all the   19
unconditional model estimations, around 20% of funds yield a statistically significant 
value of alpha by a conventional t-test.  
 
In terms of the factor loadings, the t-statistics across all unconditional models are 
consistent in showing the market risk factor and the size risk factor as statistically 
significant determinants of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns. For example, in 
the case of model 3, the Cahart four-factor performance measurement model, the cross-
sectional average t-statistic attached to the market risk factor is 27.93 while for the size 
risk factor the average t-statistic is 5.437. In fact, in results not shown for model 3 in 
Table 4.1, 100% and 79% of the mutual funds indicated a statistically significant t-
statistic on the market and size risk factors respectively. The value risk factor, with an 
average t-statistic of 1.326 in model 3 does not appear to be a significant influence in 
explaining equity returns. Only 24% of the sample of mutual funds produced a significant 
t-statistic on this risk factor. The one-year momentum factor from the Carhart 
specification (model 3) also appears to be relatively unimportant where only 21% of 
funds registered the momentum effect as an important determinant of returns.  
 
 
4.2.2 Conditional Beta Models of Performance    
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the estimation results of the conditional beta models 
described above. Following Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Kosowski et al (2003), the 
public economic information variables used to model predictable variation in conditional 
betas include (i) the yield on a UK one-month Tbill, (ii) the slope of the term structure 
defined as the yield on the UK 20 year gilt minus the yield on the one-month Tbill and 
(iii) the dividend yield on the FT A All Share index.  
 
For example model 6 is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model with the market 
factor loading ‘conditioned’ on the full set of public information variables. Model 7 and 
model 8 are Fama and French three-factor specifications where the market factor loading 
is conditional on the full set of, and a subset of, the public economic information   20
variables respectively. Model 11 is also a Fama and French based factor model but in this 
case all factor loadings are specified as conditional on the dividend yield.  
 
The findings in relation to alpha and the distribution of alpha among these 
conditional beta models are remarkably similar to those in Panel A for the unconditional 
factor models. According to all conditional beta models the average mutual fund manager 
underperformed the market except, as previously, when a market timing factor is 
specified in the Treynor-Mazuy model (model 10). Although, from all models, alpha is 
not significantly different from zero, on average. Again, in results not shown, only about 
20% of funds yield a statistically significant value of alpha at the 5% significance level 
by a standard t-test.  
 
Once again, the conclusions regarding the significance of the factor loadings are 
very similar to those reached with the unconditional factor models, ie the market factor 
and the size factor are consistently statistically significant across all conditional beta 
models while the value and momentum factors are not. (The only exception to this is in 
model 11 where the size risk factor is not significant. However, this is likely to be the 
result of a collinearity issue as the product of the size factor and the dividend yield is also 
specified in this model). It is also noteworthy that among this class of conditional beta 
models, the public economic information instruments employed to control for 
dynamically modified risk factor loadings are unanimously insignificant for the average 
fund at the 5% significance level. In results not shown, generally over this class of 
models the conditioning instruments proved to be statistically insignificant in more than 
75% of the sample of mutual of funds.    
 
 
4.2.3 Conditional Alpha and Beta Models of Performance  
Panel C of Table 4.1 describes the estimation results of the conditional alpha and beta 
models described previously. Briefly, this class of models permits a conditional 
specification of alpha as well as of beta. Panel C also reveals, once again, that the full set 
of conditioning public economic information variables are not found to be significant (on   21
average) in any of the conditional alpha and beta models by a t-test at 5%. This is also a 
robust finding from alternative conditional model specifications among results not shown 
where the conditional alpha coefficients prove to be insignificant by a t-statistic for more 
than 90% of the sample of funds.  
 
The unanimous and unambiguous insignificance of the conditioning variables in 
the conditional beta and conditional alpha and beta models provides strong evidence 
against conditional models as the ‘true’ models of equilibrium security returns. 
Conditional factor model specifications permit dynamically adjusted portfolio 
sensitivities or generally embody market timing activities on the part of fund managers. 
The above tests provide evidence that fund managers collectively either (i) do not 
dynamically adjust the risk factor loadings of the portfolio, or at least do not do so 
successfully or (ii) do not adjust the factor loadings in response to the set of public 
economic information variables examined in this study. This finding is consistent with 
evidence from market timing tests among UK unit trusts in the literature (Fletcher (1995), 
Leger (1997)). While parametric tests inherently involve a joint hypothesis, Jiang (2003) 
also finds against superior market timing activity from nonparametric tests on US equity 
mutual funds. In contrast, the unconditional models appears to be a superior model of 
security returns.   
      
Notwithstanding this caveat regarding conditional factor models as the ‘true’ 
model of equilibrium security returns, in this study factor models from each of the three 
classes of models (unconditional, conditional beta and conditional alpha and beta factor 
models), are selected for the bootstrap analysis. This is done as a means of examining the 
robustness of findings from the bootstrap procedure across alternative models of 
equilibrium returns. However, owing to the above caveat, bootstrap results from the 
conditional models should be treated with caution and perhaps given less weight relative 
to the better fit unconditional models.  
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4.2.4 Selecting Representative Models of Performance 
Panels A, B and C in Table 4.1 present model selection statistics including the (cross-
sectional average) Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Panel A indicates that from 
among the class of unconditional models the three-factor Fama and French specification, 
with an SIC measure of 1.299, provides the best fit (on average over all mutual funds). 
Indeed this model provides the best fit from among all classes of models estimated, a 
finding also reported in Kosowski et al (2003).  Panel B indicates that model 8, the three-
factor Fama and French model with the market factor loading conditioned on the market 
dividend yield, generates the lowest SIC value of 1.309. Finally, among the conditional 
alpha and beta models presented in Panel C, model 14 is suggested for selection by the 
SIC with the lowest measure of 1.331. However, this last model is very similar to model 
8 above where alpha is also specified as conditional on the dividend yield. Given the 
similarity between model 8 and model 14, in the interests of presenting results from a 
wider disparity of specifications model 15 is instead selected from among the conditional 
alpha and beta models. Model 15, which also has a relatively low SIC value of 1.359, is 
also a three-factor Fama and French model where all three factor loadings are time 
varying. This conditional specification hypothesizes that the fund manager dynamically 
modifies the portfolio’s sensitivity to the three risk factors based on a signal provided by 
the market dividend yield.  
 
Therefore, in this study model 2, model 8 and model 15 are selected as 
representative models from within each of the three classes of models above for the 
bootstrap analysis to follow in section 6.     
 
 
4.2.5 Non-normality and Serial Correlation 
Also shown in Table 4.1 are statistics describing the percentage of mutual funds within 
each performance measurement model for which the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed regression residuals is rejected by a Jarque-Bera test at the 5% significance 
level. In addition, for each model the percentage of funds which reject the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation among the estimated residuals by a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test   23
for up to 6 lags is also shown. In the case of all performance measurement models the 
normality assumption is rejected for around 70% of the mutual funds. It is this finding 
which largely motivates the use of the bootstrap technique as non-normal residuals 
suggests that the alpha estimates themselves are also non-normally distributed which in 
turn invalidates the use of standard statistical tests such as the t-test and F-test. The 
finding of widespread non-normally distributed fund residuals also questions the 
reliability of past research which draws inferences from t-tests and F-tests regarding 
mutual fund abnormal performance. This strongly motivates the need to bootstrap 
performance estimates to determine whether significant outperformance (and 
underperformance) exists in the mutual fund industry.  
 
The LM test statistics in each panel of Table 4.1 suggest that in the case of all 
performance measurement models a sizeable proportion (around 45%) of mutual fund 
estimations exhibit serial correlation of order one. This has implications for the 
implementation of the bootstrap methodology. Firstly, it is important to modify the 
bootstrap procedure to preserve the information content in the serial correlation in order 
that the bootstrap simulations mimic the original fund return generating process as 
closely as possible. Secondly, the use of Newey-West autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics, 
as in this study, should incorporate the correct order of serial correlation.  
 
This concludes the description of the model selection process. In the next section 
the bootstrap methodology is implemented and results discussed.     24
Table 4.1.  Model Selection: Cross-Sectional Results of Model Estimations. 
 
Table 4.1 presents results from the estimation of the performance models described in Section 4 using all mutual 
funds. Panel A relates to unconditional models, Panel B relates to conditional Beta models while Panel C relates to 
conditional Alpha and Beta models. T-statistics are based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
adjusted standard errors. (t-statistics shown are cross sectional averages of the absolute value t-statistics). Also 
shown are statistics on the percentage of funds which (i) reject normality among the residuals by a Jarque-Bera test 
at 5% and (ii) reject a null hypothesis of no serial correlation among residuals at lags 1 and 6 by a LM test at 5%. 
Also shown is the Schwartz Information Criterion, a model selection criterion which trades off goodness of fit 
against degrees of freedom. This table also shows the alpha and its t-statistic for an equal weighted portfolio of all 
mutual funds. All figures shown are cross-sectional averages. 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Factor Models  
           
     1  2 3 4 5 
Model     CAPM FF Carhart TM  MH 
            
Regression Coefficients            
Average Alpha (percent per month)      -0.29  -0.069  -0.072  0.086  0.228 
t-statistic       1.022  1.251 1.283 1.135 1.212 
Standard Deviation of Alpha      0.223  0.219  0.222  0.300  0.418 
            
Unconditional Betas             
(t-statistics in parentheses)   Rmrf 
















(5.437)    
HML 




(1.326)    
PR1YR
        
0.010 
(1.240)    
            
Market Timing Measures            
Treynor - Mazuy 
         
-0.005 
(1.527)   
Merton-Henriksson 
           
-0.149 
(1.272) 
            
Model Selection Criteria            
Adjusted  R-square       0.743  0.821 0.824 0.747 0.746 
SIC       1.521  1.299 1.309 1.534 1.537 
Rejection of Normality (% of funds)      71  72  70  71  71 
LM(1) statistic (% of Funds)      45  42  42  44  44 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds)      38  38  39  40  38 
            
Equal Weighted Portfolio             
Alpha     0.027  -0.141  -0.146  0.174  0.370 
t-statistic       0.380  -3.110  -3.183  2.291  3.499 
   25
Table 4.1 Continued, Panel B: Conditional Beta Models 
 
   6 7 8  9 10  11 
Model    FS FF(1)  FF(2)  Carhart TM FF(3) 
              
Regression Coefficients              
Average Alpha (percent per month)    0.015  -0.042  -0.042  -0.045  0.106  -0.045 
t-statistic     1.053  1.210  1.204  1.234  1.147  1.215 
Standard Deviation of Alpha    0.251  0.226  0.221  0.224  0.305  0.216 
              
Unconditional Betas              



































       
0.009 
(1.194)    
              
Market Timing Measures              




       
-0.005 
(1.165)   
              
Conditioning Variables, Zt-1              
Z1t-1*Rmrft ,  Z1: One month rate 









Z2t-1*Rmrft ,  Z2: Term Spread   









Z3t-1*Rmrft ,  Z3: Dividend Yield 













Z3t-1*SMBt   
             
0.009 
(1.546) 
Z3t-1*HMLt   
            
0.032 
(1.018) 
              
Model Selection Criteria           
Adjusted R-square     0.751  0.828  0.824  0.831  0.753  0.828 
SIC     1.568  1.341  1.309  1.353  1.587  1.338 
Rejection of Normality (% of funds)    71  71  71  69  70  71 
LM(1) statistic (% of Funds)    44  43  41  43  43  44 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds)    40  42  39  44  42  41 
              
Equal Weighted Portfolio               
Alpha   0.076  -0.107  -0.110  -0.116  0.162  -0.110 
t-statistic   1.079  -2.417  -2.465  -2.580  2.177  -2.524 
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Table 4.1 Continued, Panel C: Conditional Alpha and Beta Models 
 
   12 13 14  15 16 17  18 
Model    FS  FF(1) FF(2)  FF(3) FF(4) FF(5)  Carhart 
Regression Coefficients                
Average Alpha (percent per month)    0.361  0.028  0.161  0.134  -0.175  -0.097  0.028 
t-statistic     0.951  0.978  0.957  1.026  0.948  0.935  1.001 
Standard Deviation of Alpha    1.506  1.438  1.205  1.247  1.217  0.808  1.422 
                
Unconditional Betas                













(9.488)  (7.363) 
SMB  0.283 










(1.914)  (5.479) 
HML  -0.006 










(1.068)  (1.342) 
PR1YR  0.010 
            (1.917) 
                
Conditioning Variables, Zt-1                
Z1t-1*Rmrft ,  Z1: One month rate 











Z2t-1*Rmrft ,  Z2: Term Spread   




(1.314)    
-0.248 
(1.411)   
-0.192 
(1.287) 
Z3t-1*Rmrft ,  Z3: Dividend Yield 








(1.465)    
-0.033 
(1.247) 
Z3t-1*SMBt   
         
0.010 
(1.571)    
 
Z3t-1*HMLt   
        
0.030 
(1.016)    
 
Z1t-1*SMBt   




Z1t-1*HMLt   
















Z2t-1   


















(1.026)    
-0.204 
(0.982) 
                
Model Selection Criteria             
Adjusted R-square     0.753  0.830  0.825  0.829  0.826  0.826  0.832 
SIC     1.638  1.413  1.331  1.359  1.378  1.375  1.424 
Rejection of Normality (% of funds)    72  70  71  70  72  73  68 
LM(1) statistic (% of Funds)    45  49  44  48  46  46  50 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds)    42  46  38  42  45  43  47 
Equal Weighted Portfolio                 
Alpha   0.498  0.262  0.283  0.350  0.191  0.049  0.260 
t-statistic    1.633  1.560  1.632 2.026  1.197  0.384 1.555   27
 
Section 5. Data Description 








6.1 Bootstrap Analysis of Mutual Funds – All Investment Objectives 
In Section 4, performance measurement models were described and a representative 
model was selected from each of the three classes of unconditional alpha models, 
conditional beta models and conditional alpha and beta models. The findings from the 
application of the bootstrap methodology, as described in section 3, to these selected 
models are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below.    
 
  Table 6.1 presents bootstrap statistics for the full sample of mutual funds, ie 
including funds of all investment objectives. Panel A reports findings for the 
unconditional Fama and French three-factor model, Panel B presents results for the 
conditional  Fama and French model where the time varying market risk factor loading is 
specified as conditional on the market dividend yield and Panel C relates to the Fama and 
French conditional alpha and beta performance model where each risk factor loading is 
assumed to be modified in response to the market dividend yield. For ease of presentation 
results are reported for selected points in the cross-sectional distribution of performance 
as indicated. The first row in each panel shows alpha, measured in percent per month. 
The second row in each panel presents “t-alpha”, the corresponding t-statistic of the alpha 
in row 1. Row 3 (“t-stat”) presents the t-statistics of alpha ranked from lowest to highest 
where the t-statistic here is employed as a second measure of fund performance. Row 4 
(“p-tstat”) reports the bootstrap p values of the t-statistic in row 3. As explained in section 
3 on methodology, the t-statistic measure has the advantage that it scales the alpha 
measure by its estimation error and is likely to have superior statistical properties in the 
extreme tails of the performance distribution. For this reason, throughout section 6 the t-
statistic of alpha is employed as the performance measure and the bootstrap findings are   28
discussed in terms of the p values of the t-statistics. For further statistical reliability the 
analysis is restricted to funds with a minimum of 60 observations, unless as otherwise 
stated. This leaves 724 funds in this analysis. All t-statistics of alpha discussed in this 
study, ie both actual (unmodified) t-statistics of alpha and bootstrap t-statistics of alpha 
are based on Newey-West adjusted heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted 
standard errors. All bootstrap results reported throughout this section are based on 1,000 
simulations.  
 
  In Table 6.1, Panel A reveals that the best fund ranked by alpha from the 
unconditional model achieved abnormal performance of 0.745% per month. This fund 
alpha has a t-statistic of 2.546. However, the highest ranked fund by the t-statistic of 
alpha has a t-statistic of 4.023. The bootstrap p value (of the t-statistic) equal to 0.056 
indicates that from among the 1,000 bootstrap simulations across each and all of the 
funds under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, 5.6% of the highest 
bootstrap t-statistics were greater than 4.023. Operating strictly at 95% confidence, the p 
value of 0.056 fails to reject the hypothesis that the performance of the best fund (as 
ranked by the t-statistic of alpha) is within the boundaries of performance that may be 
explained by random chance or luck at that point in the performance distribution. The p 
value of 0.056 fails to reject the hypothesis that the top ranked fund does not possess 
genuine stock picking ability. However, at 90% confidence (or even 94% confidence in 
this case) the hypothesis that the performance of the top ranked fund is merely due to 
luck is rejected, ie the fund possess genuine stock picking talent.   
  
Looking across the entire right tail of the performance distribution, the evidence 




th ranked funds do not exceed 
performance which could be explained by random sampling variability in the t-statistic 
measure at 95% confidence at each of these points in the performance distribution. 





th) are sufficiently skilled in selecting stocks to cover their costs (annual charges 
imposed) and produce genuine abnormal performance for their investors. As one moves   29
closer towards the centre of the performance distribution there is no evidence in support 
of stock picking ability among funds at each these points in the distribution.  
 
In the left tail of the distribution, ie the left side of Panel A, the worst ranked fund 
by alpha yields a negative return of 0.901% per month with a t-statistic of –2.532. The 
lowest ranked fund by the t-statistic of alpha yields a t-statistic of –7.414. The bootstrap p 
value of the t-statistic of alpha of 0.000 at this point in the performance distribution 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that this fund’s performance may be explained by bad luck 
alone. This fund has produced ‘truly’ inferior performance. The bootstrap p value 0.000 
means that from among the 1,000 bootstrap simulations across each of the funds under 
the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, none of lowest bootstrap t-statistics 
were lower than –7.414.    
 
It is clear from the left tail of the distribution in Panel A that all observed 
(unmodified) performance levels at these selected points in the distribution are worse 
than may be explained by sampling variation in the performance measure around zero 
actual abnormal performance, ie this poor performance is worse than may be attributable 
to bad luck.   
 
As an alternative interpretation, the bootstrap procedure may be used to estimate 
how many funds from the sample one might expect to achieve a given level of alpha 
performance by random chance alone. This number can then be compared to the number 
of funds which actually achieve this level of alpha. For example, based on the bootstrap 
estimates from the unconditional model one would expect 6 funds to achieve an alpha 
estimate of 0.5% per month or higher based on random chance alone. In fact, 13 funds in 
the sample exhibit this level of performance (or higher). However, alphas of 0.1% or 
higher are expected to be achieved by 171 funds solely based on chance while in fact 
only 133 funds are observed to have reached this level of performance. This 
interpretation is, of course, consistent with the discussion of the p values above at 
selected points in performance distribution: there is greater evidence of genuine   30
outperformance at higher ranked points in the performance distribution relative to lower 
ranked points.       
 
  Figure 6.1 offers an alternative insight into mutual fund performance relative to 
luck. The Figure plots Kernel density estimates of the distributions of both the actual 
(unmodified) t-statistics of alpha and the bootstrap distribution of the t-statistics of alpha. 
Both distributions are estimated from the unconditional model for all investment 
objective funds. The distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics (solid line) is a graphical 
illustration of the random variation or dispersion in the t-statistics of alpha around a ‘true’ 
value of zero as this distribution is constructed under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance. Therefore this bootstrap distribution provides a picture of the range in 
performance that may be expected simply due to chance or luck. Comparison between 
this distribution and the cross-sectional distribution of the actual t-statistics of alpha puts 
actual performance in context relative to luck. It is clear from Figure 6.1 that the actual 
performance distribution (dashed line) lies largely to the left of the bootstrap distribution. 
The exception to this is in the extreme right tail, ie the top end of the performance 
distribution. This again indicates that there are a number of high ranking funds which 
achieve performance which is superior to that explicable by chance alone. However, 
comparing the left tails of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics, poor 
performing funds cannot attribute performance to bad luck.    
 
  Figure 6.2a and Figure 6.3a show the bootstrap histogram of alpha at selected 
points of the performance distribution. The upper left panel of Figure 6.2a shows the 
histogram of the best alpha across funds from 1,000 bootstrap resamples under the null 
hypothesis of no outperformance while the upper right panel shows the 1,000 fifth best 
alphas and so on. It is quite evident from the four panels of Figure 6.2a that the best 
bootstrap alphas are highly non-normal and have a relatively high variance but that the 
histogram more closely approximates normality and exhibits a lesser variance as we 
move even slightly closer to the centre of the performance distribution. As can be seen 
from Figure 6.2b, which presents histograms of fund regression residuals at various 
points in the performance distribution, this finding follows closely from the fact that the   31
residuals from the best unmodified fund regressions exhibit higher variance and a greater 
degree of non-normality than the residuals of funds closer to the centre of the 
performance distribution. It is this high variance among the top funds’ regression 
residuals, and in particular the existence of large positive residuals, that causes these 
funds to populate the top end of the bootstrap alpha distributions and generate a wide 
dispersion among these top alphas in the bootstrap procedure.  
 
In Figure 6.3a and Figure 6.3b an almost mirror image of this is presented for the lower 
end of the performance distribution. The upper left panel of Figure 6.3a shows the 
histogram of the 1,000 worst alphas across funds generated from the bootstrap procedure 
under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, the upper right panel shows the 
histogram of the fifth worst 1,000 alphas across funds etc. Once again it is evident that 
the histograms of performance at the worst point in the performance distribution exhibits 
a higher variance and a greater non-normality than the histograms of performance closer 
to the centre of the performance distribution. Similar to above, as can be seen from 
Figure 6.3b, this reflects the fact that the residuals from the worst fund alpha regressions 
exhibit higher variance and greater non-normality than the residuals of funds closer to the 
centre of the performance distribution. Again, it is this high variance among the worst 
funds’ regression residuals (and the existence of large negative residuals) that causes 
these funds to populate the lower end of the bootstrap alpha distributions and generate a 
wide dispersion among these alphas in the bootstrap procedure.  
 
  This non-normality and high variance among the residuals and alpha estimates of 
the top and bottom fund regressions motivates the use of the bootstrap procedure to more 
correctly identify the distribution of performance at the extreme ends of the performance 
spectrum and therefore to more accurately draw inferences regarding the statistical 
significance of individual fund performance. Identifying the funds at the upper and lower 
end of the performance spectrum is of greater interest to the investor and researcher. The 
above investigation of the distributions of the residuals and of the bootstrapped alphas 
clearly demonstrates the non-normal nature of performance at these points in the 
performance distribution. This in turn highlights the potential for error in drawing   32
inferences regarding top and bottom fund performance based on statistical tests which 
rely on the normality assumption.    
 
  The central limit theorem indicates that the distribution of actual and bootstrapped 
fund alphas is approximated by normality. However, the bootstrap procedure 
significantly improves upon this approximation. (See Bickel and Freedman (1981) and 
Hall (1986)). Furthermore, this improvement is particularly important at the extreme ends 
of the performance distribution where, as was seen above, deviations from normality are 
most acute. In addition, the extreme ends of the performance distribution are the areas of 
greater interest to investors and researchers.           
 
In Panel B, Table 6.1, the bootstrap findings from the conditional beta model are 
reported. The interpretation of results for both the left and right tail of the performance 
distribution is quite similar to that found for the unconditional model in Panel A. In the 
positive performance tail of the distribution, p values of the t-statistic of alpha less than 
0.05 again point to genuine stock picking ability on the part of fund managers at these 
points in the performance distribution (adjusted for, or net of, annual charges imposed by 
the fund). The conditional beta model suggests the existence of genuine stock picking 
ability among many (although not all) funds ranked at the 95
th percentile or higher.  
 
In the left tail, poor performance is again found to be worse than that which may 
be explained by random sampling variation in the t-statistic performance measure around 
a true value of zero by construction. The hypothesis that poor performance is attributable 
to bad luck therefore is again strongly rejected at 95% confidence.  
 
Panel C of Table 6.1 presents bootstrap findings for the conditional alpha and beta 
performance model. Consistent with the previous two classes of model, the conditional 
alpha and beta model points to true superior performance in the upper end of the 
performance distribution. Indeed this class of model points more strongly to more 
widespread genuine outperformance than either the unconditional model or the 
conditional beta model previously. The conditional alpha and beta model in Panel C   33
suggests that funds ranked at the 60
th percentile and higher perform better than could be 
accounted for by mere good luck.    
 
However, in the left tail of the performance distribution in Panel C, the evidence 
regarding whether funds truly underperform bad luck is mixed and generally differs from 
the results of the previous two classes of model. With the exception of some selected 
points in the performance distribution around the 5
th worst, 5
th percentile and 10
th 
percentile, the results from this class of conditional alpha and beta model generally 
indicate that one cannot reject the hypothesis that poor performance is within the 
boundaries of random chance or bad luck.  
 
In order to investigate these contrasting results further among the p values of the 
t-statistic of alpha and to test the robustness of the bootstrap findings, bootstrap estimates 
of the t-statistics of alpha under a null hypothesis of no abnormal performance were 
constructed for several alternative performance measurement models within each of the 
three classes of model. The selected results presented here prove to be remarkably robust 
to selecting alternative models within each class.    
 
The bootstrap methodology in this study has been applied here to the three classes 
of model as test of robustness in the findings. In summary, the unconditional model and 
the conditional beta model are generally found to yield similar conclusions regarding 
genuine stock picking ability among UK equity mutual funds. However, the model 
estimation results and bootstrap findings are sensitive to the specification of a conditional 
alpha measure. However, while such a specification is of economic significance it is not 
statistically significant. Recall from section 4 (Table 4.1, Panel C) that the set of public 
economic information variables applied to condition alpha were all shown to be 
statistically insignificant (on average across funds) in all alternative conditional alpha and 
beta model specifications shown  (and in many further specifications not shown). Indeed, 
as also reported in section 4, within any conditional alpha and beta model examined, the 
set of variables used to condition alpha were statistically insignificant for more than 90% 
of the sample of mutual funds. This evidence from almost the entire population of UK   34
equity mutual funds over a long sample time period would appear to be quite compelling 
evidence that the conditional factor models simply do not represent the ‘true’ model of 
equilibrium security returns. (At least this is the case given the chosen set of public 
information variables selected in this study to condition alpha and beta. This was the 
same set of conditioning public information variables adopted by Kosowski et al (2003), 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998)).  
 
Accordingly, this study finds that the unconditional three-factor Fama and French 
model is a more robust and reliable model of equilibrium security returns. Consequently, 
the estimation results and bootstrap p values above from the conditional models should 
be interpreted with caution. Therefore, in order to be more confident in the findings from 
the bootstrap analyses to follow, the unconditional three-factor Fama and French model is 
selected as the ‘benchmark’ model upon which conclusions are based.  
 
  
6.2 Performance and Investment Styles 
It is of also interest to investors to identify whether stock picking talent is related to the 
investment objective of the fund. From the mutual fund performance and persistence 
literature, particularly among studies of the US fund industry, there is some evidence that 
mutual funds with a growth stock investment style tend to be among the top performing 
funds (Chen, Jegadeesh Wermers (2000)). In this study, when the performance analysis is 
restricted to funds with a minimum of 60 observations, for improved statistical reliability, 
there are 724 funds remaining. These consist of 192 income funds (27%), 82 growth 
funds (11%), 326 general equity (income and growth) funds (45%) and 124 small stock 
funds (17%). The top 10 performing funds, ranked by the t-statistic of alpha from the 
three-factor unconditional model, are comprised of 4 income stock funds, 3 growth stock 
funds, 2 general stock funds and 1 small stock fund. The corresponding breakdown of the 
top 50 funds is 23, 7, 13 and 7 respectively while the breakdown of the top 40% of the 
performance distribution (top 290 funds) is: 110, 28, 113 and 39 respectively. At the 
opposite end of the performance scale, the worst 10 funds consist of 3 income stock 
funds, 1 growth stock fund, 5 general equity funds and 1 small stock fund. The   35
corresponding breakdown of the bottom 50 funds is 5, 7, 29 and 9 respectively while the 
composition of the bottom 40% of the performance distribution is: 41, 38, 152 and 59 
respectively. In this simple analysis income stock funds and growth funds perform 
relatively well while general equity funds and small stock funds compare poorly. For 
example, income stock funds comprise 27% of the total sample of funds but comprise 
38% of the top 40% of the performance distribution and 46% of the top 50 ranked funds. 
However, income stock funds make up only 14% of the bottom 40% of the distribution 
and only 10% of the bottom 50 funds. In general, in relative terms income stock funds 
disproportionately occupy the upper end of the performance distribution and are 
disproportionately absent from the bottom end. Although less pronounced, growth stock 
funds similarly outperform. In contrast, general equity funds comprise 45% of the total 
sample of funds but make up only 39% of the top 40% of the performance distribution 
and only 26% of the top 50 funds while this class of funds comprises 53% of the bottom 
40% of funds and 58% of the bottom 50 funds. Here, general equity funds appear to 
disproportionately occupy the bottom end of the performance distribution and are 
disproportionately absent from the top end. Similarly, although again slightly less 
pronounced, small stock funds also underperform in relative terms.        
   
To further address the question of relative performance of mutual funds of 
different investment styles, this study implements the bootstrap procedure separately 
within each subgroup of investment styles or objectives. These investment styles are 
declared by the funds themselves but certified initially and subsequently monitored 
monthly by the Investment Management Association in the UK. Examining the 
performance and skills of managers separately within each fund classification has the 
added advantage that in each case one is examining a more homogenous risk group. This 
helps to control for possible unknown cross-sectional risk characteristics which may be 
unspecified by the equilibrium model of returns.  
  
In Table 6.2, Panels A, B, C and D present the ranked alpha performance 
measures, its associated t-statistic, the ranked t-statistics of alpha and the bootstrapped p 
values of the t-statistics of alpha for the four mutual fund investment objectives: equity   36
income, equity growth, general equity (income and growth) and small company stocks 
respectively. Following the discussion in Section 6.1, these bootstrap findings are 
estimated by the unconditional three-factor model. Looking at all four Panels in Table 6.2 
it is clear that performance is not evenly divided between investment sectors. Based on 
the bootstrap p values of the t-statistics, it is evident from Panel A and Panel B that many 
high ranking equity income funds and equity growth funds respectively, again as ranked 
by the t-statistic of alpha, achieve levels of performance which cannot be accounted for 
by random sampling variation in the t-statistic where its true (assigned) value of zero. In 
particular, within the equity income investment style funds ranked at the selected points 
and percentiles from the 5
th highest to the 90
th percentile beat the bootstrap estimate of 
luck (estimated from among the peer group of funds) at 95% confidence. The 3
rd highest 
ranked fund beats luck at 90% confidence. However, the 1
st and 2
nd highest ranked funds 
achieve abnormal returns which are not beyond the boundaries of that which may be 
explained by sampling variation in the performance measure at their respective points in 
the performance distribution. Similarly, among equity growth funds, in the right tail of 
the performance distribution p values of 0.05 or less indicate genuine stock picking 
ability at 95% confidence. While one cannot reject the hypothesis that the performance at 
the extreme top end could be attributed to good luck, the performance of slightly lower 
ranked funds cannot be so attributed at these points in the performance distribution.  
 
In contrast, the separate bootstrap applications to the investment classes of general 
equity funds and small stock funds in Table 6.2 Panel C and Panel D respectively 
indicates comparatively poor performance. Among general equity funds, only the 
extreme highest ranked fund beats luck while all lower ranked funds are well within the 
boundaries of performance that may be accounted for simply by chance, based on the 
peer group of funds. Among small stock funds, there is no evidence of genuine 
outperformance or stock picking ability in the right tail of the performance distribution. 
The evidence in support of stock picking ability among income stock funds and growth 
stock funds but the apparent absence of such talent among general equity funds and small 
stock funds is consistent with the conclusions from the more simple analysis provided 
above.    37
 
In the case of small stock funds, in order to examine the possible sensitivity of 
performance findings to the choice of the benchmark risk factor for size, in this study the 
bootstrap procedure was repeated for an alternative size benchmark. In the Fama and 
French three-factor unconditional model the size risk factor, SMBt, (ie returns on small 
cap stock minus returns on large cap stocks - see sections 4,5) was substituted by a small 
cap index. However, the conclusions discussed above were unaltered.   
 
From a different perspective, in the case of income stock funds, for arbitrarily 
selected level of performance of say 0.1% per month, the bootstrap procedure indicates 
that 47 funds would be expected to achieve or exceed this level of performance simply by 
chance. In fact 52 funds achieve or exceed this performance. In contrast among general 
equity funds, the same ratio is 73:47.  
 
The finding of outperformance among growth stock funds is consistent with 
similar findings from among US studies. Indeed using a similar bootstrap methodology 
Kosowski et al (2003) also report that growth stock funds perform well in relative terms. 
However, the evidence in this study against the existence of stock picking ability among 
small stock mutual funds is clearly at variance with the school of thought that the market 
for small stocks is less efficient. If this hypothesis is correct it has not been exploited by 
UK small stock fund managers.  
 
From Table 6.2 Panels A, B, C and D, the performance ‘picture’ in the left tail of 
the distribution is similar across all four investment classes of funds. Among all four 
investment styles, in particular at the lower end of the performance distributions, the 
bootstrap p values of the t-statistic of alpha of less than 0.05 indicate that one can reject 
the hypothesis (at 95% confidence) that these funds were merely unlucky in their 
performance. This is consistent with the results of the procedure when all funds were 
examined together.                            
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From Table 6.2 a caveat should be noted when comparing the relative stock 
picking abilities in excess of good luck of funds of different investment objectives. By 
estimating the bootstrap p values separately within each investment class, the bootstrap 
distribution of the t-statistics of alpha under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance, ie the estimate of luck, is based only on the peer group (same investment 
style) of funds in each case. The estimate of, or proxy for, luck is not necessarily the 
same for each investment style and hence care should be taken when comparing across 
investment classes under separate bootstrap analyses. In contrast, in Table 6.1 the 
bootstrap estimate of luck is based on the full sample of all funds.   
 
In conclusion, by the three factor unconditional model, which is found to be the 
best fit and most reliable model of performance measurement, we find evidence in 
support of genuine stock picking ability, controlling for sampling variability, among a 
number of top ranking UK equity mutual funds. Furthermore, our findings suggest is 
more prevalent among mutual funds with an income stock investment style and a growth 
stock investment style but is absent from the subclass of funds with an investment 
objective of investing in (i) small stocks and (ii) general equity, ie income and growth 
stocks together. In contrast, we find that funds ranking at the low end of the cross-
sectional performance distribution cannot attribute their poor performance merely to bad 
luck.   
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Table 6.1: Statistical Significance of Mutual Fund Performance  
 
Table 6.1 presents bootstrap statistics for the full sample of mutual funds including all investment objectives for each of the three performance measurement 
models selected in section 4. Panel A reports bootstrap statistics from the unconditional Fama and French (three-factor) model. Panel B presents results from the 
conditional beta Fama and French model. Panel C relates to the Fama and French conditional alpha and beta model. The first row in each panel reports alpha in 
percent per month at various points and percentiles in the performance distribution ranging from worst fund (min) to best fund (max). The second row reports the 
associated t-statistic of these alpha measures. Row 3 contains the t-statistics of alpha ranked from lowest (min) to highest (max). Row 4 reports the bootstrap p 
values of these t-statistics, (ie where the t-statistic of alpha is the performance measure). p values are based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples. Both actual 
(unmodified) and bootstrap t-statistics in this study are based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.  
 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Model   
 
min  5.min min5% min10% min40% max40% max10% max5% max3% 20max 15max 12max 10max 7max 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha  -0.901  -0.663  -0.427  -0.330 -0.108 -0.027  0.181  0.301 0.411 0.439  0.478  0.507  0.530  0.588  0.598  0.686  0.723  0.745 
t-alpha  -2.532  -4.445  -1.563  -2.406 -1.591 -0.235  1.757  1.920 3.389 0.806  2.777  2.776  1.698  4.023  2.556  2.991  1.322  2.546 
 t-stat   -7.414  -4.724  -3.077  -2.537  -0.958  -0.216  1.242  1.670  2.023  2.196  2.403  2.522  2.544  2.671  2.776  2.991  3.389  4.023 
p-tstat   0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  1.000  0.824  0.508  0.169  0.016  0.004  0.006  0.022  0.066  0.132  0.159  0.059  0.056 
 
 
Panel B: Conditional Beta Model 
 
min  5.min min5% min10% min40% max40% max10% max5% max3% 20max 15max 12max 10max 7max 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha  -0.662  -0.614  -0.376  -0.315 -0.095 -0.004  0.195  0.336 0.444 0.486  0.557  0.580  0.602  0.639  0.731  0.804  0.812  1.123 
t-alpha  -2.566  -6.884  -3.353  -2.985 -0.969 -0.044  1.454  1.234 2.265 2.289  0.767  3.144  1.855  2.799  1.072  2.776  3.701  1.803 
t-stat  -6.884  -4.149  -3.001  -2.371 -0.798 -0.027  1.362  1.837 2.161 2.289  2.341  2.556  2.650  2.776  2.799  3.701  4.088  4.368 
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Table 6.1 continued.  
 
Panel C: Conditional Alpha and Beta Model  
 
min  5.min min5% min10% min20% min40% max40% max10% max5% max3% 20max 12max 10max 7max 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha  -4.871  -3.708  -1.609 -1.125  -0.586  -0.106  0.292  1.389  1.964  2.638 2.781 3.353 3.573  4.200  4.379  5.402  7.028  11.273 
t-alpha  -2.070  -3.214  -2.210 -1.846  -0.648  -0.269  0.470  3.527  3.466  2.629 1.900 2.750 1.463  1.927  2.217  1.616  1.977 4.583 
t-stat -4.053  -3.091  -1.995 -1.509  -0.868  -0.197  0.466  1.816  2.217  2.750 2.768 3.181 3.371  3.463  3.527  3.858  4.583 4.816 
p-tstat 0.129 0.038 0.009  0.036  0.745  0.927  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 0.014 
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Table 6.2: Statistical Significance of Mutual Fund Performance by Investment Objective 
 
Table 6.2 presents bootstrap statistics for the separate bootstrap analyses of mutual funds categorized by investment objectives. Panel A reports results for the 
class of funds investing in income stocks. Panel B reports results for growth funds. Panel C reports results for general equity (income and growth) funds. Panel D 
reports results for small stock funds. All results pertain to the unconditional Fama and French three-factor model. The first row in each panel reports alpha in 
percent per month at various points and percentiles in the performance distribution ranging from worst fund (min) to best fund (max). The second row reports the 
associated t-statistic of these alpha measures. Row 3 contains the t-statistics of alpha ranked from lowest (min) to highest (max). Row 4 reports the bootstrap p 
values of these t-statistics. p values are based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples. Both actual (unmodified) and bootstrap t-statistics in this study are based on Newey-
West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.   
 
 
Panel A: Equity Income    
 
min  5.min min5% min10% min20% min40% max40% max20% max10% max5% max7% max3% 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha  -0.666  -0.315  -0.227  -0.164 -0.106  -0.0131 0.027  0.121  0.208  0.284 0.240 0.365  0.382  0.431  0.459  0.478 
t-alpha  -7.414  -3.148  -2.313  -1.178  -0.873  -0.240 0.202  1.225  1.623 2.673  2.522  2.196  2.403  2.544  1.726  2.777 
t-stat  -7.414  -3.148  -2.469  -1.648  -0.981  -0.318 0.281  0.954  1.623 1.927  1.757  2.403  2.522  2.673  2.777  3.389 
p-tstat 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.008  0.148  0.289  0.413  0.154  0.005  0.046  0.045  0.003  0.004 0.058 0.122 0.106 
 
 
Panel B: Equity Growth    
 
min  2.min  3.min  5.min min7% min10% min40% max40% max10% max7% 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha -0.393 -0.384 -0.345 -0.305 -0.299  -0.247  -0.141  -0.057  0.161  0.301  0.377  0.543  0.598 0.745 
t-alpha -3.562 -1.865 -3.318 -3.146 -2.859  -4.121  -1.511  -0.243  1.466  1.920  2.529  2.671  2.556 2.546 
t-stat  -4.121 -3.687 -3.562 -3.146 -2.859  -2.236  -1.129  -0.427  1.463  1.920  2.282  2.546  2.556 2.671 
p-tstat 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.175  0.042 0.004 0.014 0.102  0.333 
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Table 6.2 continued 
 
 
Panel C: General Equity     
 
min  2.min  3.min  5.min min3% min5% min10% min40% max40% max10% max5% max3% 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha -0.740 -0.673 -0.661 -0.650 -0.490  -0.413  -0.324  -0.130  -0.044  0.135  0.280  0.439  0.514  0.593  0.606 0.723 
t-alpha -3.043 -2.050 -3.199 -2.970 -2.574  -3.751  -1.937  -0.951  -0.624  0.889  1.529  0.806  2.127  1.450  2.292 1.322 
t-stat  -5.166 -4.777 -4.190 -4.118 -3.625  -3.160  -2.706  -1.190  -0.418  1.053  1.427  1.627  2.127  2.500  2.776 4.023 




Panel D: Smaller Companies      
 
min  2.min  3.min  5.min min5% min10% min40% max40% max10% max5% 5.max 3.max 2.max  max 
Alpha -0.901 -0.663 -0.589 -0.528 -0.520  -0.469  -0.250  -0.105  0.215  0.317  0.466  0.530  0.546 0.686 
t-alpha -2.532 -4.445 -2.728 -2.234 -3.077  -2.680  -1.135  -0.489  1.176  1.610  1.788  1.698  1.578 2.991 
t-stat  -4.445 -3.306 -3.116 -3.095 -2.915  -2.739  -1.506  -0.470  0.792  1.570  1.610  1.788  2.409 2.991 
p-tstat 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.654 0.850 0.877 0.338  0.225   44
Figure 6.1: Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap distribution. 
 
Figure 6.1 presents the Kernel density estimates of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha from the unconditional three-factor 
performance measurement model over the full sample of mutual funds. t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted. Funds with a minimum of 60 observations are used. 
The plots are generated using a Gaussian Kernel function.    
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Figure 6.2a: Histograms of Bootstrap Alpha Estimates   
        (Upper End of the Distribution)  
 
Figure 6.2a presents histograms of the bootstrap alpha estimates at various points in the upper end of the performance 
distribution. These are estimated by the unconditional three-factor performance measurement model over the full 
sample of mutual funds.  
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Figure 6.2b: Histograms of Residuals  
(Upper End of the Distribution)  
 
Figure 6.2b presents histograms of the residuals from the estimation of alpha at various points in the upper end of the 
performance distribution. These are estimated by the unconditional three-factor performance measurement model over 
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Figure 6.3a: Histograms of Bootstrap Alpha Estimates   
          (Lower End of the Distribution) 
 
Figure 6.3a presents histograms of the bootstrap alpha estimates at various points in the lower end of the performance 
distribution. These are estimated by the unconditional three-factor performance measurement model over the full 
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 Figure 6.3b: Histograms of Residuals   
          (Lower End of the Distribution) 
 
Figure 6.3b presents histograms of the residuals from the estimation of alpha at various points in the lower end of the 
performance distribution. These are estimated by the unconditional three-factor performance measurement model over 
the full sample of mutual funds.  
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Section 7. Conclusion 
 
This study evaluates the performance of the UK equity unit trust sector using a large 
sample of 1,596 trusts over the period April 1975 – December 2002. Fund abnormal 
performance is first examined by applying a wide range of alternative models of 
equilibrium security returns, ie of risk adjusted (abnormal) performance measurement. 
These include models which incorporate dynamically adjusted risk factor loadings 
conditional on public information signals (conditional beta models), models which allow 
for conditional abnormal performance based on public information (conditional alpha 
models) as well as market timing models and unconditional factor models.  
 
Using a number of selected best-fit models a bootstrap procedure is applied to a 
large sample of funds. The procedure bootstraps fund abnormal performance under a null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal performance. The bootstrap procedure provides a means of 
constructing a distribution of performance which is simply due to random sampling 
variation but where in fact there is no abnormal performance. In turn, this provides an 
estimate of chance performance or ‘luck’. This is, a large number of bootstrap 
simulations enables the construction of a nonparametric distribution of performance at 
each point or percentile in the performance distribution. Therefore, given the sample of 
funds it is possible to establish the distribution of best fund performance, second best 
performance through all percentiles of performance to the worst fund performance under 
a null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance. From such a distribution it is possible to 
assess whether the best fund exhibits genuine stock picking talent or whether in fact we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the fund’s risk adjusted performance was simply due to 
random chance alone (luck). Similarly, it is possible to test whether poor fund 
performance is due to a lack of stock picking ability or whether it is within the boundaries 
of bad luck. In addition, from the bootstrap distribution it is possible estimate how many 
funds in the sample one would expect to achieve a given level of performance simply de 
to chance and compare this to how many funds in fact achieve this level.     
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Applying a number of alternative models of performance measurement, the 
results indicate that an unconditional three-factor Fama and French type model with 
market, size and value risk factors fits well as a model of equilibrium returns. On the 
other hand there is no advantage in model specifications which conditionalise factor 
loadings and abnormal performance on public information or specify market timing 
features.  
 
Applying the bootstrap procedure to the three-factor unconditional model this 
study finds strong evidence in support of genuine stock picking ability on the part of 
many top ranked UK equity unit trusts. A number of fund managers in the positive tails 
of the performance distribution exhibit levels of performance which cannot be 
attributable to mere random chance. On the other hand for a large number of fund 
managers in the negative tail of the distribution, the hypothesis that their poor 
performance is attributable to bad luck is strongly rejected at 95% confidence.  
 
To examine whether stock picking talent among mutual funds may be dependent 
on the investment style of the fund, the bootstrap methodology is also applied separately 
to funds classified by four investment styles of objectives. These include objectives of 
investing in growth stocks, income stocks, general equity (income and growth) and 
smaller companies. The existence of stock picking talent is more strongly supported 
among income funds and among growth funds but is less evident among general equity 
funds and among small stock funds.  
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